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In response to debt crises, policy makers often feature Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in
sovereign bonds among the pillars of international financial architecture. However, the content of
official pronouncements about CACs suggests that CACs are more like doorknobs: a process tool
with limited impact on the incidence or ultimate outcome of a debt restructuring. We ask whether
CACs are welfare improving and, if so, whether they are pillars or doorknobs.
The history of CACs in corporate debt suggests that CACs can be good, bad or unimportant
depending on their vulnerability to abuse and the available alternatives, including bankruptcy and
debt exchanges.
The history of CACs in sovereign bond workouts is recent and thin. Without restructuring data,
the empirical literature has focused on the ex-ante (pricing) effects of sovereign CACs. To the
extent that CACs leave borrowing costs unchanged or even lower them, they are likely to be
welfare improving. But the magnitude of the welfare effects cannot be inferred from these
studies.
Based on the evidence so far, we conjecture that sovereign CACs are like doorknobs: useful, but
perhaps not essential. To date, there is no evidence of abuse of the sort observed in U.S. corporate
bond restructurings in the 1920 and 1930s. The bulk of pricing studies suggests that any increases
in borrowing costs are small. On the other hand, debt exchanges using transactional techniques
other than CACs have had a decent track record, suggesting that CACs are not the only way to
resolve a debt crisis in the absence of a treaty-based bankruptcy alternative.
Future empirical work should focus on how CACs perform in debt restructuring rather than on
their ex ante effects.

Introduction
Debates about Europe’s financial architecture have paid Collective Action Clauses (“CACs”) in sovereign
bond contracts the sort of attention normally accorded to load-bearing cathedral pillars. CACs allow creditor
majorities to reduce or postpone the debtor’s payment obligations and bind dissenting minorities. 1 No other
debt contract clause comes close to CACs’ fame. Treaties and communiques commit to adopt CACs.
Newspapers editorialize about CACs. Heads of state speak knowingly of CACs’ virtues. At the other
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extreme, anyone who says “CACs” and “Italy” in the same breath might get accused of preaching Italexit
and shattering the postwar peace. As befits high-profile policy initiatives, CACs have inspired a substantial
body of theoretical and empirical scholarship, including a large crop of bond pricing studies with
dramatically divergent results.
A puzzling picture emerges from all the policy, market, and academic output about CACs. On the one hand,
the fact that leaders and their ministers repeatedly turn to CACs in response to crises bespeaks CACs’ loadbearing significance. Surely officials would not bother with CACs—to the exclusion of other contract
terms—if they did not expect CACs to make a big difference in crisis management. However, if CACs were
effective at reducing debt crisis costs, sovereign debtors that adopt CACs might take less care to avoid
crises and, once in crisis, might find more appeal in debt restructuring. This may lead investors to charge
extra or refuse to lend altogether.
On the other hand, the contents of official pronouncements about CACs convey the opposite message. Here
CACs are an innocuous process tool, relevant only when the debtor cannot pay and debt restructuring is
inevitable. CACs play no role in the debtor’s decisions to reform or to repay. They reduce deadweight losses
and might affect distribution among creditors on the margins after the debtor decides to restructure. Under
the circumstances, investors could value CACs positively, negatively, or not at all.
The former view positions CACs as a core structural element in the European architecture—if not pillars
or walls, at least doors or windows. In the latter, CACs look more like doorknobs. To be sure, doorknobs
are both symbolically and functionally important. A rusty antique signifies neglect, or an old-fashioned
sensibility. Turning a sleek, well-oiled knob is far preferable to breaking down the door or jumping out of
the window. Nonetheless, doorknobs rarely swing decisions to enter, exit, or to invite guests. They might
affect the manner of entry and exit, which is no small thing when the house is on fire.
This essay reconsiders the place of CACs in the European and global financial architecture, and the range
of possible effects the inclusion of CACs in sovereign debt contracts might have on the probability of
default, recovery values, bond prices, and welfare.
Commentators in financial architecture debates invariably describe CACs as a “market-based,” “marketfriendly,” or even “market-led” alternative to treaty-based or statutory sovereign bankruptcy. 2 It is an
incomplete description both when it comes to CACs’ market roots and to the range of available alternatives.
Majority amendment clauses appear to have sprung up organically in English corporate debt in the late 19th
century. They have surfaced on sovereign debt policy agendas periodically at least since the 1930s, when a
League of Nations committee considered both statutory and contractual voting mechanisms to help manage
the tide of sovereign defaults. 3 In the mid-1990s, CACs in sovereign bonds became part of an evolving set
2

See e.g., Paul Bedford and Chris Salmon, ‘Resolving Sovereign Debt Crises: The Market-Based Approach and the
Role of the IMF’ [2005] Financial Stability Rev, <www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financial-stabilityreport/2005/june-2005> accessed 1 July 2019; David Sabel, ‘An Introduction to the Euro Area’s Model Collective
Action Clause’ in Klaus-Albert Bauer, Andreas Cahn and Patrick S. Kenadjian (eds), Collective Action Clauses and
the Restructuring of Sovereign Debt (de Gruyter 2013); Alfredo Bardozzetti and Davide Dottori, ‘Collective Action
Clauses: How Do They Affect Sovereign Bond Yields?’ (2014) 92 J of Intl Economics 286; Group of Ten, ‘The
Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crises’ (Group of Ten, A Report to the Ministers and Governors Prepared Under
the Auspices of the Deputies, May 1996) < www.bis.org/publ/gten03.htm> accessed 1 July 2019.
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Sovereign Debt Markets’ in Gregoire Mallard and Jerome Sgard (eds), Contractual Knowledge: One Hundred Years
of Legal Experimentation in Global Markets (Cambridge University Press 2016)
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of initiatives under the rubric of international financial architecture—to vigorous opposition from financial
market participants, who saw them as an effort to shift crisis costs onto creditors. 4
Financial industry views on CACs softened as new crises brought more intrusive treaty-based sovereign
bankruptcy proposals. Starting in 2003, three waves of increasingly robust CAC reforms spread across
sovereign debt markets in quick succession. Each of the three began as policy responses to market shocks:
the first, to Argentina’s 2001 default and the bankruptcy proposals that followed, the second, to the Euro
area crisis in 2010, 5 and the third, to successful holdout lawsuits against Argentina and to Greece’s 2012
bond restructuring.
Successive versions of CACs differ in scope and substance, and would be expected to produce different
restructuring outcomes. The first wave focused on emerging market borrowers and New York-law
sovereign bonds, where by custom, amending payment terms required unanimous creditor consent. Under
first-wave CACs, each bond issue is polled separately; in most cases, amendment requires more than 75%
supermajority approval. This means that creditors who control more than a quarter of any outstanding bond
issue can block its restructuring. The first wave had a limited impact on Europe, where most sovereign debt
is governed by the debtor’s own law. 6
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See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes, Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors
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Mitu Gulati, ‘Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study’ (2006) 84 Washington University L Rev 1627. The
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_resolution_a_proposal.pdf> accessed 1 July 1, 2019; Jan Strupczewski, ‘Finland Proposes CACs as Part of Euro
Crisis Resolution’ (Reuters, 28 October 2010) <https://www.reuters.com/article/eurozone-resolutionproposal/finland-proposes-cacs-as-part-of-euro-crisis-resolution-idUSWEA540120101028> accessed 1 July 2019;
‘Franco-German Declaration: Statement for the France-Germany-Russia Summit’ (Folketinget EU-Oplysingen, 18
October 2010) <https://www.eu.dk/~/media/files/eu/franco_german_declaration.ashx?la=da> accessed 1 July 2019;
European Commission, ‘Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)’ Press Release D/12/3
(2012) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-12-3_en.htm>. For context, see Bauer K, ‘The Euro Area’s
Collective Action Clause – Some Questions and Answers’ in Klaus-Albert Bauer, Andreas Cahn and Patrick S.
Kenadjian (eds), Collective Action Clauses and the Restructuring of Sovereign Debt (de Gruyter 2013); Anna
Gelpern and Mitu Gulati, ‘The Wonder-Clause’ [2013] 41 J of Comparative Economics 367.
6
European governments committed to include CACs in their foreign-law debt beginning in 2004 as part of the G-7
effort to “lead by example” and encourage emerging market governments to adopt CACs. Although some contracts
changed, this was not an economically or politically significant event because the affected contracts in most cases
stood at (much) less than ten per cent of the government’s debt stock, and because no one considered CAC issuance
by rich European countries a good proxy for the emerging market experience. See e.g., Patrick Kenadjian, ‘The
Aggregation Clause in Euro Area Government Securities: Game Changer or Flavor of the Month? – Background
and the Greek Experience’ in Klaus-Albert Bauer, Andreas Cahn and Patrick S. Kenadjian (eds), Collective Action
Clauses and the Restructuring of Sovereign Debt (de Gruyter 2013).
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The second wave was all about Europe. Member states’ commitment to adopt functionally identical CACs
was announced in 2010 and later incorporated in the treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM). Issuance began in 2013. Euro area CACs apply to foreign and domestic bonds, and use aggregated
supermajority voting across multiple bond series combined with a lower 50% threshold for individual series
votes. Aspiring free-riders would have to control at least half of an outstanding bond issue. 7 Euro area
CACs also let independent central banks and government pension funds vote their holdings of their own
governments’ bonds.
The third wave began in 2014 and was initially limited to foreign sovereign bonds. However, in late 2018,
European institutions set on a path to include third-wave CACs in all Euro area medium and long-term
sovereign debt securities. Unlike their predecessors, third-wave CACs effectively eliminate holdouts.
Amendment requires a single 75% vote across multiple bond series; everyone polled is bound if the debtor
abides by contractual safeguards. 8
Industry groups ultimately played an important role in the design and diffusion of all three waves of CACs.
Yet none of the three would have happened without sustained intervention by governments in the world’s
wealthiest countries. Official speeches, working groups, outreach seminars, multilateral work-streams,
high-level bilateral meetings, and monitoring exercises launched each new version of CACs, and nurtured
to widespread adoption.
It is clear in retrospect that CACs in today’s sovereign bonds may be market-ratified and relatively marketfriendly, but they are not of the market. This blindingly obvious point has important consequences. CACsas-financial-architecture respond to international public policy—not necessarily debtor or creditor—
objectives. The three sets of objectives might coincide perfectly if policy intervention makes up for market
failure (creditor coordination) and merely reduces deadweight losses in restructuring. CACs could also turn
out to be useful as rhetoric, but functionally unimportant. After all, modern sovereign bond restructurings
with or without CACs have proceeded more quickly and smoothly than had been expected, thanks in part
to new transactional tools adapted from the corporate world. 9 Barring perfect coincidence and
insignificance, contracts with CACs must incorporate tradeoffs to satisfy market objectives. The simplest
tradeoff is price, but “in-kind” tradeoffs are just as plausible. 10
7

Although Uruguay in 2003 and Argentina in 2005 had included aggregated voting in their restructured bond
contracts, they were the rare exceptions to the rule. In 2010, sovereign bonds either had no CACs or had CACs that
required each bond series to be polled separately.
In Europe, voting thresholds determine the outcome unless the sovereign debtor can use local law to
override contracts after the fact. Whether the ESM treaty permits such an override is not settled. Mark Weidemaier,
‘Restructuring Italian (or Other Euro Area) Debt: Do Euro CACs Constrain or Expand the Options?’ (2 April 2019)
< https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3364982> accessed 16 July 2019; Yannis Manuelides, ‘Using
the Local Law Advantage in Today’s Eurozone’ (17 June 2019) <
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405422> accessed 1 July 2019.
8
If 75% of the polled bond stock supports the restructuring proposal, it becomes binding on all would-be holdouts.
If the proposal fails to clear 75%, there is no restructuring. To use this aggregation mechanism under the industry
model of the clause, a sovereign debtor must offer the same terms to all affected bondholders. The debtor can still
create multiple voting pools, offer different terms to different pools, and sequence the votes as it sees fit, so long as
it discloses its plans to the other bondholders.
9
Ran Bi, Marcos Chamon and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, ‘The Problem That Wasn’t: Coordination Failures in Sovereign
Debt Restructurings’ (2016) 64 IMF Economic Rev 471.
10
In-kind tradeoffs might be sprinkled throughout the contract, as with new anti-manipulation and information
covenants and higher supermajorities to amend non-financial terms. Some tradeoffs may be hidden: in the past,
sovereigns have tweaked issuance parameters to mask the expected effect of CACs on their bond prices and bond
market liquidity. For instance, Mexico’s first issue with CACs was designed to avoid comparisons with benchmark
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In this essay, we take the policy perspective and consider the welfare implications of CACs in light of
sovereign and corporate restructuring experience. While majority voting in sovereign debt restructuring has
a limited track record, 11 its history in corporate restructuring is long, rich, and controversial. Our brief
survey of the corporate context in Part I suggests that the welfare effects of majority amendment terms such
as CACs are very sensitive to the availability of alternative restructuring technology, including bankruptcy
and debt exchanges. Doorknobs are all-important on the only door out of a sealed warehouse; they are
probably dispensable on a gazebo. We elaborate on this intuition in a theoretical sketch in Part II, addressing
the relationship between bond prices and the welfare effects of CACs.
We find that even if the price of CACs in sovereign bonds were discernible (a point still debated in the
literature), it would not necessarily reveal the welfare effects of adopting CACs, although it might narrow
the range of possibilities. If CACs are shown to reduce borrowing costs, welfare must increase or at least
remain unchanged. Even if it remains unchanged, all the effort that went into promotion and adoption might
have been wasted. If welfare increases, it would still be important to know why borrowing costs went down
with CACs. Is it because CACs reduce the deadweight losses of default or because they reduce debtor
bargaining power? Do lower costs point to a lower probability of debt restructuring, to higher recovery
values in its aftermath, or some combination of the two? Are there cases in which investors simply do not
worry about debtor moral hazard when pricing debt with CACs? 12
Empirical studies to help policy makers decide whether CACs are a good idea would have to know (i)
whether a given debtor would default opportunistically, (ii) whether using CACs leads to more or less debt
relief than other debt restructuring methods, and (iii) whether CACs reduce deadweight losses in a
sovereign debt crisis, and by how much. Studies of the ex-post effects of CACs could help answer these
questions. There are few such studies, however, in part because there have been few sovereign debt
restructurings with CACs. 13
We proceed as follows. Part I compares the experience with CACs in corporate and sovereign debt. CACs
in corporate debt have helped shape sovereign debt contracts and restructuring practice; yet they are hardly
mentioned in the sovereign debt literature. The role of contractual voting mechanisms in corporate workouts
has changed over time, contingent on the availability and quality of alternative debt restructuring tools—
including, but not limited to bankruptcy. Part II puts these and related observations in a stylized theoretical
framework. We describe eight ways in which CACs could affect the probability of default, recovery values,
issues that did not have CACs. Some European sovereigns changed interest payment dates to help secondary market
liquidity as they transitioned to CACs. Borrowers expressed concern about liquidity because clearing platforms and
market participants did not treat bonds with different amendment terms as fungible. Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati,
‘Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study’ (2006) 84 Washington University L Rev 1627; Anna Gelpern,
Mitu Gulati and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, ‘If Boilerplate Could Talk: The Work of Standard Terms in Sovereign Bond
Contracts’ [2019] Law & Social Inquiry. Meanwhile, restructuring practices evolve with new contract terms and
lessons from experience. Ran Bi, Marcos Chamon and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, ‘The Problem That Wasn’t:
Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings’ (2016) 64 IMF Economic Rev 471. As contracts and
market practice adapt over time, the full effect of any given version of CACs may not become apparent for years.
11
Moody’s, ‘The Role of Holdout Creditors and CACs in Sovereign Debt Restructurings’ (Sovereign Defaults
Series, Moody’s Investors Service, 2013).
12
In an earlier study, we asked investors what concerned them the most about CAC language that appeared to leave
room for manipulation by the debtor. A handful said they worried about deeper haircuts and lower recovery values;
no one suggested that restructuring would become more likely with that or any other version of CACs. Gelpern et al.
‘If Boilerplate Could Talk: The Work of Standard Terms in Sovereign Bond Contracts’ [2019] Law & Social
Inquiry.
13
For a recent exception, see Chuck Fang, Julian Schumacher and Christopher Trebesch, ‘Restructuring Sovereign
Bonds: Holdouts, Haircuts and the Effectiveness of CACs’ (Working Paper, June 2019).
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deadweight losses, and overall welfare. We expect the welfare effects in this framework to be highly
context-specific The existing literature does not yet allow us to choose which of the eight scenarios obtains
in a given sovereign debt crisis, and therefore could not determine the welfare effects of including CACs
in particular sovereign bonds. We conclude with research and policy implications.
I. Corporate Debt Ghosts
It is not surprising to find contemporary policy engagement with CACs and workout techniques in
sovereign bonds drawing on the corporate debt experience. 14 In contrast, corporate debt contracts and
corporate workout experience barely rate a mention in the growing empirical literature on sovereign CACs.
Voting in corporate workouts—in and out of bankruptcy—has a rich history full of holdout creditors,
manipulative debtors, faithless agents, judicial and regulatory intervention. By comparison, the history of
CACs in sovereign bond workouts is recent, thin and bland: just a few dozen restructured bonds and one
big courtroom drama (Argentina), where CACs figured in a dubious aside while another clause stole the
show. 15 Because we view ex post restructuring experience as potentially central for assessing the welfare
effects of CACs, we turn to corporate debt for clues to the likely impact of CACs in sovereign workouts. A
key lesson from the literature on corporate workouts is that CACs’ performance must be judged relative to
the available alternatives. In other words, CACs look compelling if the alternative to majority modification
is disorderly default and massive deadweight losses. They look inessential and possibly distortive if the
debtor can secure the necessary debt relief in bond exchanges with exit consents, targeted domestic
legislation, or by majority vote in bankruptcy.
CACs were reportedly introduced in English corporate bonds in 1879 and quickly became corporate market
standard in London 16. At least two other majoritarian coordination mechanisms preceded CACs and
operated in parallel with them: bondholder committees and stock exchange rules that shut defaulting debtors
out of the London market 17. Both were used in sovereign debt. Weidemaier and Gulati trace the first CAC
in a sovereign bond to Czechoslovakia’s 1922 issue coordinated with the League of Nations. 18
Flandreausuggests that CACs’ added value in sovereign debt would have been uncertain in the late 19th
century owing to the challenge of enforcing contracts against absolutely immune debtors, and the ability of
bondholder committees and stock exchange rules to achieve acceptable results without CACs. 19
Reinforcing Flandreau’s argument, Czechoslovakia did not even consider using its CACs when it had to
restructure the 1922 bond many years later. 20

14

See e.g., Lee C. Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati, ‘Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges’ (2000) 48 UCLA L
Rev 59; Lee C. Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati, ‘Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will’ (2004) 51 Emory L J 131.
15
Moody’s, ‘The Role of Holdout Creditors and CACs in Sovereign Debt Restructurings’ (Sovereign Defaults
Series, Moody’s Investors Service, 2013); Chuck Fang, Julian Schumacher and Christopher Trebesch,,
‘Restructuring Sovereign Bonds: Holdouts, Haircuts and the Effectiveness of CACs’ (Working Paper, June 2019);
NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012).
16
Lee C. Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati, ‘Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will’ (2004) 51 Emory L J 131;
Antonio Sainz de Vicuna y Barroso, ‘Identical Collective Action Clauses for Different Legal Systems: A European
Model’ in Klaus-Albert Bauer, Andreas Cahn and Patrick S. Kenadjian (eds), Collective Action Clauses and the
Restructuring of Sovereign Debt (de Gruyter 2013).
17
Marc Flandreau, ‘Sovereign States, Bondholders Committees, and the London Stock Exchange in the Nineteenth
Century (1827-68): New Facts and Old Fictions’ (2013) 29 Oxford Rev of Economic Policy 668.
18
Weidemaier and Gulati (n. 1).
19
Marc Flandreau, ‘Sovereign States, Bondholders Committees, and the London Stock Exchange in the Nineteenth
Century (1827-68): New Facts and Old Fictions’ (2013) 29 Oxford Rev of Economic Policy 668.
20
Weidemaier and Gulati (n. 1).
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CACs in U.S. corporate bonds gained popularity in the 1920s as a faster, cheaper alternative to courtsupervised equity receiverships 21. Corporate, municipal, and sovereign bond defaults in the 1920s and the
1930s revealed rampant abuse by bondholder representatives, bankers, and corporate equity holders, and
led to the prohibition on majority amendment in publicly-issued, SEC-registered U.S. corporate bonds
under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (“TIA”). An eight-volume SEC report, compiled under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 mandate, featured hundreds of pages of examples of bankers taking bribes to do
corporate managers’ bidding, and bondholder committees using threats, inducements, and outright lies to
recruit bondholders. Vote-buying and selling were rampant. Equity holders and their agents bought up
corporate debt, voted it, and effectively expropriated arm’s length creditors. 22 Although the authors of the
SEC report were keenly aware of the holdout problem, 23 they were more worried about abuse in out-ofcourt workouts and relaxed about available alternatives. The TIA consciously limited firms’ out-of-court
workout options and sought to confine majority rule to the newly enacted corporate bankruptcy
reorganization framework. Roe points out that subsequent jurisprudence limited the use of majority
amendment even in bankruptcy 24; majority rule in bankruptcy remained on shaky footing until the 1978
amendments to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 25
At about the same time as the SEC was cataloguing corporate restructuring abuses, the League of Nations
committee on sovereign debt contracts looked for ways to promote creditor coordination, and even
commissioned a survey of statutory and contractual majority amendment mechanisms. The U.S. SEC report
on bond workouts contained plenty of misdeeds involving sovereign debt, but did not recommend banning
majority modification in sovereign bonds, because it would be quite pointless:
In fashioning these regulatory measures, it will not be possible even to approximate the type of
supervision and control which inheres in bankruptcy or receivership courts, since the assets of the
debtor are not subject to process in this country and no power exists to subject them to such
jurisdiction. By the same token there is no control over the debtor in any real or legalistic sense.
Hence any system of control must fall short of assuring, to the degree possible in the domestic field,
production of reorganization or readjustment plans which are fair and equitable. As we have said,
assets cannot be collected; claims cannot be enforced; debtors cannot be restrained from wasteful
or unconscionable practices; leverage cannot be placed in the hands of creditors; priorities of
creditors cannot· be enforced, as in domestic bankruptcies or receivership.26
The United States was relatively late to ban CACs in corporate debt. Germany had severely limited majority
rule under its Debt Securities Act of 1899, which could have inspired (or had shared inspiration with) the

21

William W. Bratton and Adam J. Levitin, ‘The New Bond Workouts’ (2018) 166 University of Pennsylvania L
Rev 1597.
22
See e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission Report on the Study and
Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees (U.S.
Government Printing Office 1936); Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission
Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective and
Reorganization Committees (U.S. Government Printing Office 1937); Aladdin Hotel v. Bloom, [1953] 200 F.2d 627
(8th Cir.).
23
“It is clear that the inertia of security holders is great and the difficulty of getting them assembled tremendous.”
SEC (1937) (n 14); See also Mark Roe, ‘The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts’ (1987) 97 Yale L J 232.
24
Roe, supra note 24.
25
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, Sec. 316(b). Each debt holder’s right to receive payment under publicly issued
corporate debt securities could not “be impaired or affected without the consent of such holder.”
26
SEC (1937) (n 14), p. 737.
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voting prohibition under the TIA 27. The Debt Securities Act remained in effect until a replacement law in
2009 law specifically permitted CACs. Debtors and creditors may not have felt the urgency of repeal
because, long before the replacement was enacted, German firms had circumvented the law by issuing debt
in London, where CACs were permitted 28.
The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Luxembourg and Japan comprised the small handful of
jurisdictions that had never banned CACs 29. Throughout the 20th century, most other countries prohibited
or severely limited contractual majority amendment of payment terms, much like Germany and the United
States. All but the United States have recently repealed the unanimity requirement 30. In this fragmented
legal regime, some U.S. firms have bonds that include both CACs and unanimity, depending on market
custom in the issuance jurisdiction. 31
The TIA’s prohibition on CACs in publicly traded corporate debt has drawn sharp criticism from law
scholars, including the seminal contribution by Roe 32 as well as a vigorous defense by Brudney, 33 among
others. Critics blamed the prohibition for deadweight losses in drawn-out bankruptcy reorganizations that
had enjoyed the support of large creditor majorities on the eve of the bankruptcy filing. They also argued
that the requirement of unanimous consent did not serve its stated purpose of protecting unsophisticated
bondholders, preventing abuse, and distorting incentives. Instead, it encouraged workarounds that were
even harsher on dissenting minority investors 34. Supporters of the prohibition pointed out that bankruptcy
avoidance was often fleeting, illusory, or both: about half the firms ended up in bankruptcy anyway, so that
the net result of out-of-court restructurings was to prolong the agony without delivering more relief. 35
Out-of-court corporate workouts appear to come in clumps 36. They may be responding to background
macroeconomic and credit conditions, as well as tax, regulatory, and contract developments. Debt contracts
and restructuring practices also respond to legal shocks. Most recently, Bratton and Levitin document a
small but clearly discernible shift to majority amendment in U.S. corporate bonds exempt from SEC

27

See Jason Grant Allen, ‘More Than a Matter of Trust: The German Debt Securities Act 2009 in International
Perspective’ (2011) 7 Capital Markets L J 55.
28
Jason Grant Allen, ‘More Than a Matter of Trust: The German Debt Securities Act 2009 in International
Perspective’ (2011) 7 Capital Markets L J 55.
29
Jason Grant Allen, ‘More Than a Matter of Trust: The German Debt Securities Act 2009 in International
Perspective’ (2011) 7 Capital Markets L J 55; Sonke Haseler, ‘Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign
Bond Contract – Whence the Opposition?’ (2009) 23 J of Economic Surveys 882.
30
Jason Grant Allen, ‘More Than a Matter of Trust: The German Debt Securities Act 2009 in International
Perspective’ (2011) 7 Capital Markets L J 55; Sonke Haseler, ‘Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign
Bond Contract – Whence the Opposition?’ (2009) 23 J of Economic Surveys 882; Carlos Berdejo, ‘Collective
Action Clauses & Corporate Bond Spreads: Evidence from Chile’ (2016) 36 Northwestern J of Intl L & Business
469.
31
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indenture with unanimity, but also in Europe under English law, using majority amendment CACs.
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Mark Roe, ‘The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts’ (1987) 97 Yale L J 232.
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Victor Brudney, ‘Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good,’ (1992) 105 Harvard
Law Review 1821.
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For an overview of the debate, see Bratton and Levitin (n. 22).
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See e.g., Edward I. Altman and Brenda Karlin, ‘The Re-Emergence of Distressed Exchanges in Corporate
Restructurings (2009) 5 J of Credit Risk 43.
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registration requirements, adapting to the aftermath of a Federal Court ruling in New York that briefly cast
doubt on the enforceability of exit consents. 37
This latest corporate experience casts doubt on the urgency of banning or promoting CACs against the
background of credible alternative workout paths. CACs have not been the only, nor necessarily the best
means of addressing corporate debt overhang. Debt exchanges, even clearly coercive ones (discussed
below), delivered debt reduction and survived court challenges for decades. 38 Corporate restructuring
practices have evolved to reflect contractual, regulatory, and statutory constraints, as have their sovereign
counterparts 39.
Multi-creditor corporate debt contracts can be restructured in three ways, broadly defined: using contractual
majority amendment terms such as CACs to bind dissenters, with debt exchanges (using exit consents to
penalize dissenters), and in bankruptcy or a bankruptcy-style collective restructuring under judicial
supervision. The first two approaches predate robust corporate bankruptcy reorganization statutes. In the
United States, the corporate debtor must choose between bankruptcy and a debt exchange. Debtors may use
CACs or debt exchanges in a targeted way to postpone debt payments and conserve liquidity, or for a more
fundamental restructuring as a way to avoid what they perceive as deadweight losses in bankruptcy. 40
In a debt exchange, creditors trade in their debt claims for new ones that relieve the firm’s debt burden.
Debt exchanges rely on a combination of sticks and carrots to get enough relief and dissuade free-riders.
Exit amendments (also called exit consents) are sticks, widely used to achieve high participation and
dissuade potential holdouts. When the debtor invites existing creditors to trade their old debt securities for
new ones, it also asks (and sometimes requires) them to vote to amend the residual debt, leaving behind
illiquid or effectively subordinated securities, even where core payment terms remain unchanged. Debtors
may prefer debt exchanges to CACs when they worry about clearing the amendment threshold. Recent
research suggests that debt exchanges may be associated with deeper debt relief for the firm, partly because
it does not have to pay everyone the same. 41 Others observe that the efficiency of any given approach
depends on who holds the debt, so that widely held public bond issues should benefit the most from
bankruptcy’s strong coordination framework.
Corporate restructuring history suggests that the risk of insider abuse and opportunistic behavior by debtors
is real—with jurisprudence to prove it. 42 A customary response is that sovereign debtors would not

37

William W. Bratton and Adam J. Levitin, ‘The New Bond Workouts’ (2018) 166 University of Pennsylvania L
Rev 1597.
38
See e.g., Katz v. Oak Industries, [1986] 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch.) (coercive exit consents), Kass v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 1986 WL 13008 (Del. Ch.) (paying for votes), 28. Marblegate Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Education Mgmt.
Finance Corp., [2017] 846 F.3d 1 (2nd Cir.) (expropriating holdouts). For UK parallels, see Assenagon Asset Mgmt
S.A. v. Irish Bank Resolution Co. [2012] EWHC 2090 (Ch), HC11C01320 (coercion/expropriation); Azevedo v.
Imcopa Importacao [2014] B.C.C. 611 (paying for votes).
39
Compare Ran Bi, Marcos Chamon and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, ‘The Problem That Wasn’t: Coordination Failures in
Sovereign Debt Restructurings’ (2016) 64 IMF Economic Rev 471.
40
Some of this practice is attributable to regulation: for instance, although the TIA does not apply to exempt
securities in the United States, many firms give their creditors the option to exchange exempt securities for publicly
tradable ones, and try to keep the covenants parallel. William Bratton, ‘The New Bond Workouts’ (2018) 166
University of Pennsylvania L Rev 1597.
41
Ulrich Hege, ‘Bond Exchange Offers or Collective Action Clauses?’ (TSE Working Papers 19-1016, Toulouse
School of Economics 2019); compare Ran Bi, ‘The Problem That Wasn’t: Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt
Restructurings’ (2016) 64 IMF Economic Rev 471.
42
See, e.g., Lachlan Burn, ‘Bondholder Resolutions in the Courtroom,’ in Klaus-Albert Bauer, Andreas Cahn and
Patrick S. Kenadjian (eds), Collective Action Clauses and the Restructuring of Sovereign Debt (de Gruyter 2013)
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perpetrate insider abuse because they do not issue equity; however, such reasoning is misleading. There are
plenty of insiders and quasi-insiders in sovereign debt, ranging from government agencies to regulated
financial institutions, which could all benefit from colluding with the sovereign to expropriate creditor
minorities. On the other hand, sovereigns have to worry more about the spillover effects of default and
restructuring on their domestic economies. 43
In contrast to the large volume of empirical studies of CACs in sovereign debt, there appear to be hardly
any studies comparing restructuring outcomes or prices between corporate bonds with and without CACs. 44
This is surprising in light of the preceding discussion: the corporate bond universe is bigger than its
sovereign counterpart; CACs originated in corporate debt more or less organically; corporate bonds use a
richer variety of bond covenants than sovereign debt, and contractual workouts are far more common.
Meanwhile, only about a dozen sovereign restructurings used CACs in modern memory 45. Corporate bond
history includes legislative, regulatory, and judicial prohibition, side by side with encouragement of CACs
by government actors. This messy, noisy history of CACs in corporate debt, and the almost century-long
debate on their merits, open the possibility that the welfare effects of CACs are ambiguous. They may
facilitate debt restructuring among large numbers of diverse, dispersed creditors, but they are not the only
way to achieve the result outside bankruptcy, nor clearly the best way in light of the available alternatives.

II. The Place of Price
Quantitative empirical research has followed CAC advocacy: studies responded to demand from policy
makers, and broadly reflected policy imperatives. Policy makers who promoted CACs and debt managers
who adopted them have professed a keen interest in how CACs would affect borrowing costs, but did not
leave themselves much room for maneuver if it turned out that CACs were associated with large pricing
penalties, in line with dire warnings by industry opponents. In private, more than a few officials said they
had expected CACs to come at a discernible cost, and were surprised to find none.
Had academic studies early on linked CACs to substantial penalties, supporters might have stood down or
faced demands to defray the cost of what was, in effect, systemic crisis insurance. Two decades of academic
studies produced stubbornly inconclusive, even inconsistent, results 46. Market consensus meanwhile settled
around the view that CACs did not raise sovereign borrowing costs, but that price differences between
bonds with and without CACs might occasionally appear when default was imminent. This outcome might
have been theoretically awkward if read to suggest that investors were not forward-looking, but it was also
pragmatically ideal: small, uncertain price effects left advocates free to insist that CACs were costless
(“market-neutral”) – at worst, harmless – but stopped short of driving away those who saw in them potential
for more orderly process, market discipline, burden-sharing, or all of the above.

(UK); William W. Bratton and Adam J. Levitin, ‘The New Bond Workouts’ (2018) 166 University of Pennsylvania
L Rev 1597 (US).
43
Fernando Broner, Alberto Martin and Jaume Ventura, ‘Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets’ (2010) 100
American Economic Review 1523.
44
Carlos Berdejo, ‘Collective Action Clauses & Corporate Bond Spreads: Evidence from Chile’ (2016) 36
Northwestern J of Intl L & Business 469.
45
Chuck Fang, Julian Schumacher and Christopher Trebesch, ‘Restructuring Sovereign Bonds: Holdouts, Haircuts
and the Effectiveness of CACs’ (Working Paper, June 2019).
46
See, e.g,. the literature review in Elena Carletti, Paolo Colla, G. Mitu Gulati and Steven Ongena, ‘The Price of
Law: The Case of the Eurozone Collective Action Clauses’ (Working Paper, 16 February 2019)
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2817041> accessed July 1, 2019.
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Contemporary CAC initiatives and the associated empirical literature have, on the one hand, paid much
attention to the price of CACs and their impact on borrowing costs, and on the other hand, have boxed
themselves into promoting CACs come what may. Both may have gone too far. First, on purely theoretical
grounds, CACs may or may not be a good idea, in the sense that they could be either welfare reducing or
welfare improving. Second, the empirical pricing literature offers limited insight on whether CACs are a
good idea: while falling costs could indicate a rise in welfare or unchanged welfare, rising costs could be
consistent with a rise in welfare, a fall in welfare, or unchanged welfare. Distinguishing among these cases
would require and empirical analysis of the ex-post implications of CACs, rather than a pricing analysis.
Such analysis is only beginning to emerge 47.
Making this argument rigorously would require a formal model 48, but the main idea is easily sketched. The
central insight is that the price effects of CACs can come from several mechanisms, some of which are
good for welfare, some of which are bad because they create moral hazard, and some of which are welfare
neutral because they are confined to distribution between creditors and debtors. Consider a set-up in which
CACs change the ex-post outcomes of debt restructurings in two ways. By reducing the extent to which
holdouts can interfere with a restructuring that brings about debt sustainability, they could reduce litigation
costs and the duration of debt workouts, and hence the “deadweight losses” of restructuring. Ex post, both
creditors (other than holdouts) and the debtor benefit from this presumed effect, which is the dominant
stated reason why CACs are so popular with policy makers working on sovereign debt. In addition, CACs
could affect the bargaining power of the debtor, and hence the “haircut” suffered by the creditors. This
effect is usually presumed to benefit the debtor. But this is not necessarily the case. The predominant
alternative to CACs is a debt exchange offer with or without exit consents, and the threat of default in the
background. 49 When armed with exit consents – or simply with defiance fortified by immunity – a sovereign
debtor might use exchange offers to extract better terms from most creditors than would obtain with
amendment using CACs, perhaps settling with holdouts on the side 50. Hence, the bargaining power effect
could go either way, depending on expected litigation costs, creditor composition 51, and the debtor’s
propensity to act opportunistically.
Table 1 combines these channels through which CACs might affect debt restructuring outcomes with two
assumptions about debtor behavior. In the top row, the probability of default is assumed to be insensitive
to the effect of CACs on the consequences of default. In the bottom row, debt restructuring outcomes are
assumed to influence the probability of default through the mechanisms described in the previous
47

See, e.g., Chuck Fang, Julian Schumacher and Christopher Trebesch, ‘Restructuring Sovereign Bonds: Holdouts,
Haircuts and the Effectiveness of CACs’ (Working Paper, June 2019).
48
For example, along the lines of Elena Carletti, Paolo Colla, G. Mitu Gulati and Steven Ongena, ‘The Price of
Law: The Case of the Eurozone Collective Action Clauses’ (Working Paper, 16 February 2019)
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2817041> accessed July 1, 2019.
49
In Europe and other jurisdictions where most of the debt is governed by the borrower’s own law, the sovereign
has another alternative—using the “local law advantage” to effect modification by statute or regulation. Mark
Weidemaier, ‘Restructuring Italian (or Other Euro Area) Debt: Do Euro CACs Constrain or Expand the Options?’ (2
April 2019) < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3364982> accessed 16 July 2019; Yannis
Manuelides, ‘Using the Local Law Advantage in Today’s Eurozone’ (17 June 2019) <
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405422> accessed 1 July 2019.
50
Bi, Chamon, and Zettelmeyer, ‘The Problem That Wasn’t: Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt
Restructurings’ (2016) 64 IMF Economic Rev 471.
51
See Robert Scott, Mitu Gulati and Stephen J. Choi, ‘Hidden Holdouts: Contract Arbitrageurs and the Pricing of
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paragraph, i.e. by changing the incentives to prevent and/or to default opportunistically. The columns
describe four possible combinations of the effects of CACs on debtor bargaining power (up or down;
equivalent to saying that haircuts rise or fall) and deadweight losses of default (down or unchanged). The
cells of the matrix, finally, describe the implications of each case for borrowing costs r – assumed to depend
on the impact of CACs on both loss-given-default (lgd) from the creditor perspective and the probability of
default (pd) – and for welfare.
Table 1. Effects of CACs on bond yields and welfare
Effect of CACs on debt restructuring

(1)
Debtor
behavior

(2)

pd does
not react
to CACs
pd reacts
to CACs

No impact on deadweight losses
debtor
debtor
bargaining
bargaining
power up
power down
(1)
(2)
r up
r down

Deadweight losses reduced
debtor bargaining
power up

debtor bargaining
power down

(3)
r ambiguous

(4)
r down

W neutral

W neutral

W improving

W improving

r up
W reducing

r down
W improving

r ambiguous
W ambiguous, but
falling/unchanged r is
sufficient for rise in W

r ambiguous
W ambiguous, but
falling/unchanged r is
sufficient for rise in W

Note: pd refers to the probability of default, r to the real return required by creditors (the borrowing cost from the perspective of the
debtor), and W to welfare. “Debtor bargaining power up” corresponds to a rise in the haircut, “debtor bargaining power down” to a fall.
The loss-given-default (lgd) suffered by creditors reflects both the haircut and the deadweight loss of default. r depends on both lgd and
pd.

Consider the first row, which assumes that the probability of default is unchanged by the impact of CACs
on debt restructuring outcomes. This could be because the debtor is not forward-looking, or simply because
“ability to pay” considerations swamp any other possible determinants of the decision to restructure debt).
This case is useful both for its practical relevance and as a benchmark that makes it easier to think about
the implications of the alternative assumption, in which the debtor takes the consequences of CACs on debt
restructuring outcomes into account (row 2).
The immediate implications of the assumption that the probability of default does not react to CACs are as
follows.
•

•

Since pd is unchanged, r will change only in response to changes in lgd, the loss-given-default
suffered by the creditor. This in turn responds to changes in debtor bargaining power (higher
debtor bargaining power means a higher haircut, hence a higher lgd) and in the deadweight loss
of default (for a given debtor bargaining power, a lower deadweight loss means a lower lgd). In
cells (1,1), (1,2) and (1,4), these go in the same directions, i.e. lgd and r unambiguously rise (cell
1,1) or fall (cells 1,2 and 1,4). In cell (1,3), the impact of CACs on lgd and r is ambiguous,
however, since debtor bargaining power rises – raising haircuts – while deadweight losses fall.
The assumption that pd is unchanged rules out any debtor moral hazard effect. Hence, welfare
can only increase – if the deadweight loss of default declines (cells 1,3 and 1,4) – or stay
unchanged (cells 1,1 and 1,2).
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The second row assumes that the debtor takes the outcomes of debt restructuring into account when deciding
how much to invest in crisis prevention and/or whether to default opportunistically. An increase in haircuts
and a reduction of the deadweight losses of default will tend to increase the probability of default through
either of these channels. Since this comes at the expense of the creditor, these are forms of debtor moral
hazard. Importantly, however, the welfare effect of a reduction in the deadweight losses of debt
restructuring – that is, the efficiency gain ex post – could be positive overall, even if it leads to debtor moral
hazard, but only if the increase in the probability of default is not too high.
Armed with these insights, consider how the results of the first row are modified by the assumption that the
debtor is forward-looking (that is, takes restructuring outcomes with CACs into account):
•

•

•

•

Cell (2,1): CACs raise the haircut but do not impact deadweight losses. This raises the probability
of default at the expense of creditors (debtor moral hazard). With both lgd and pd up, yields and
sovereign borrowing costs rise. Since welfare was neutral in (1,1) it must now fall. The welfare
cost is ultimately borne by the debtor, in the form of the greater increase in borrowing cost
attributable to the increase in pd. 52
Cell (2,2): CACs do not impact deadweight losses, but lower haircuts – perhaps because they are
bundled with new safeguards elsewhere in the contract, or because they encourage holdout
behavior. This makes debt restructurings less attractive to the debtor, lowering debtor moral
hazard, so that pd declines. With both lgd and pd down, borrowing costs fall. Welfare rises.
Cell (2,3): CACs are assumed to both lower deadweight losses and raise haircuts. For both reasons,
debt restructurings become more attractive to the debtor, and pd increases. Lower deadweight
losses and higher haircuts pull lgd in different directions, so the net effect is unclear. The impact
on borrowing costs is also unclear: if lgd increases, costs would increase, but if lgd falls and pd
does not increase to offset it, costs might fall. The welfare implications are ambiguous: they depend
on the relative magnitudes of the fall in deadweight losses, the increase in haircuts and the extent
to which pd reacts. This said, if r falls or is unchanged, this would imply a welfare improvement,
since the debtor is better off both ex ante (lower borrowing costs) and ex post (lower deadweight
costs of default). Even a small increase in r could be consistent with a welfare improvement: the ex
post efficiency gain associated with lower deadweight costs of default may outweigh the moral
hazard effect.
Cell (2,4): CACs are assumed to lower both deadweight losses and haircuts. Hence, lgd
unambiguously falls, but pd might fall or rise, depending on whether the debtor reacts more to
lower deadweight losses (which make a debt restructuring more attractive) or to the lower haircuts
(which make a debt restructuring less attractive). Since the rise in pd could offset the fall in lgd, the
impact on borrowing costs is ambiguous. The impact on welfare is more likely to be positive than
in cell (2,3), since pd will rise less (if at all) due to the lower haircut. But it is still ambiguous: if
there is a large rise in pd, the rise in moral hazard might outweigh the lower deadweight loss of
default, and welfare might fall. As in cell (2,3), a fall in r implies a welfare improvement. 53

52

Put differently, if the debtor could commit not to raise pd, i.e. to be in cell (1,1) rather than cell (2,1), it would.
The Carletti and co-authors’ model can be viewed as a special case of this matrix. Elena Carletti, Paolo Colla, G.
Mitu Gulati and Steven Ongena, ‘The Price of Law: The Case of the Eurozone Collective Action Clauses’ (Working
Paper, 16 February 2019) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2817041> accessed July 1, 2019. The authors assume that (1)
unlike non-CAC bonds, bond with CACs can be restructured without any output costs (corresponding to the last two
columns of Table 1); (2) default/restructuring costs influence the restructuring decision (as in the bottom row of
Table 1). They also assume that the haircut on non-CAC bonds is either zero (full repayment) or 100 percent
(default, triggering an output cost). Their main result is that depending on the size of the output shock, either cell
53
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The relationship between changes in borrowing costs and changes in welfare can hence be summarized as
follows:
•

•

Suppose borrowing costs rise. This may be consistent with lower welfare due to debtor moral
hazard (cell 2,1), unchanged welfare (reflecting higher haircuts but no effect on pd, cell 1,1), or
even with higher welfare (cells 2,3 and 2,4). The interpretation of the higher welfare case is as
follows: while the probability of default rises, it does so for efficient reasons, namely, because
CACs lower the deadweight costs of defaults by a lot; while moral hazard either declines or rises,
but not by much.
Suppose borrowing costs fall. This could be consistent with higher welfare, due to either lower
deadweight losses with unchanged moral hazard (cell 1,4), lower deadweight losses that offset
somewhat higher moral hazard (cell 2,3 or cell 2,4 with small rise in pd), lower moral hazard with
unchanged deadweight losses (cell 2,2) or both lower moral hazard and lower deadweight losses
(cell 2,4 with fall in pd). However, welfare could also be unchanged, as the reduction in borrowing
costs might merely reflect a lower haircut, without changes in either the pd or the deadweight loss
of default (cell 2,2). Importantly, however, welfare cannot fall.

The bottom line is that the reaction of borrowing costs to CACs does not offer a reliable guide to the welfare
implications of CACs, with one important exception: if borrowing costs stay unchanged or fall, then CACs
are either welfare improving or welfare neutral. Distinguishing between these cases – or establishing the
welfare implications of CACs if they were found to raise borrowing costs—would require empirical work
on the ex-post effects of CACs: in particular, on how they influence haircuts, and whether and to what
extent they lower the deadweight losses of defaults.
Conclusions
CACs in sovereign debt use market form with roots in corporate debt to achieve policy outcomes. The
experience with CACs in corporate debt suggests that their welfare effects are uncertain ex ante, and change
over time. CACs in any given sovereign debt contract can be good or bad, importantly depending on the
efficacy of other restructuring mechanisms available to the debtor and its creditors. Other factors that can
affect CACs’ impact on welfare include the debtor’s propensity to default opportunistically and creditor
composition (relevant to deadweight losses).
While it makes sense to consider the impact of CACs on sovereign borrowing costs as part of the broader
cost-benefit calculus associated with adoption, pricing studies deliver an unambiguous welfare implication
only if they find that CACs do not raise borrowing costs. Moreover, the impact of CACs on sovereign
borrowing costs depends on factors that have not received enough attention in the existing literature. Going
forward, research on the ex post effects of CACs in sovereign and corporate bonds, particularly as compared
to other creditor coordination and workout mechanisms, would be particularly valuable. The impact of
creditor composition on the operation of CACs,54 as well as the impact of CACs on reducing deadweight

(2,3) or cell (2,4) will be relevant. For smaller output shocks, CAC bonds are restructured while non-CAC bonds
escape restructuring (as this would trigger an output loss). But for larger output shocks, CAC bonds are restructured
and there is total default on non-CAC bonds. They find that CAC bonds entail lower borrowing costs than non-CAC
bonds), consistent with either cell (2,4) or cell (2,3) for the case in which moral hazard effects are small. Erce et al.
(2019) reach a similar conclusion.
54
Robert E. Scott, Mitu Gulati and Stephen J. Choi, ‘Hidden Holdouts: Contract Arbitrageurs and the Pricing of
Collective Rights’ (10 January 2019). Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 586; NYU Law and
Economics Research Paper No. 18-27; Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2018-51.
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3203949.
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costs in restructuring, would be important for policy formulation. Because there are at least three different
model CACs and considerable variation among issuers within each model, identifying the impact of CACs
on restructuring is not straightforward. Where first-wave CACs barely move the dial, third-wave CACs
eliminate the possibility of holdouts altogether, but add safeguards to against debtor and insider abuse 55.
Our argument implies that policy makers working on Europe’s financial architecture may wish to calibrate
the emphasis on CACs as a crisis-fighting tool, and on pricing studies as tools of persuasion. Study results
so far remain “all over the map,” which is unsurprising in our stylized scheme given the diversity of factors
at play, including the availability of other workout and creditor coordination tools, and the challenge of
identifying the relevant factors in any given case.
When a house is on fire, well-functioning doors—and doorknobs—could save lives. However, keeping
doorknobs in good working order does not amount to a fire prevention strategy, or even an emergency
management plan. By the same token, a resilient financial architecture for Europe cannot be made to depend
on CACs, and must go well beyond them. In a well-conceived and well-executed architectural plan, CACs
would take up their proper ancillary role and yield public space to loftier endeavors.
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